Finite and Infinite Population Spatial Rock-Paper-Scissors in One
  Dimension by Griffin, Christopher et al.
Finite and Infinite Population Spatial Rock-Paper-Scissors in One
Dimension
Christopher Griffin ∗ Riley Mummah† Russ deForest ‡
June 2, 2020
Abstract
We derive both the finite and infinite population spatial replicator dynamics as the fluid
limit of a stochastic cellular automaton. The infinite population spatial replicator is identical
to the model used by Vickers and our derivation justifies the addition of a diffusion to the
replicator. The finite population form generalizes the results by Durett and Levin on finite
spatial replicator games. We study the differences in the two equations as they pertain to the
one-dimensional rock-paper-scissors game. In particular, we show that a constant amplitude
traveling wave solution exists for the infinite population case and show how population collapse
prevents its formation in the finite population case. Additional solution classes in variations on
rock-paper-scissors are also studied.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary games using the replicator dynamic have been studied extensively and are now well
documented [1–4]. Variations on the classical replicator dynamic include discrete time dynamics [5]
and mutations [6, 7]. Additional evolutionary dynamics, such as imitation [1, 4, 8, 9] and exchange
models [10] have been studied. Alternatively evolutionary games have been extended to include
spatial models by a number of authors [11–18]. Most of these papers append a spatial component
to the classical replicator dynamics (see e.g., [16]) or discuss finite population replicator dynamics
in which total population counts are used (see e.g., [11]). In the latter case, a spatial term is again
appended to the classical replicator structure.
In [19], Durrett and Levin study discrete and spatial evolutionary game models and compare
them to their continuous, aspatial analogs. For their study the authors focus on a specific class
of two-player two-strategy games using a hawk-dove payoff matrix. Because their payoff matrix
is 2 × 2, a single (spatial) variable p(x, t) can be used to denote the proportion of the population
playing hawk (Strategy 1) while a second variable s(x, t) denotes the total population. Using the
payoff matrix:
A =
[
a b
c d
]
,
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the remarkable reaction-diffusion equation is analyzed:
∂p
∂t
= ∆p+
2
s
∇p · ∇s+ pq((a− c)p+ (b− d)(1− p)) (1)
∂s
∂t
= ∆s+ s
(
ap2 + (b+ c)p(1− p) + (1− p)2d)− κs2. (2)
Here κ is a death rate due to overcrowding and q = (1− p). Let ei ∈ Rn be the ith unit vector. Let
u = 〈p, q〉. When κ = 0, we can rewrite these equation as:
∂p
∂t
= ∆p+
2
s
∇p · ∇s+ p (eT1 − uT )Au (3)
∂s
∂t
= ∆s+ s · uTAu. (4)
That is, Durrett and Levin have encoded the replicator dynamic into a finite population spatial
partial differential equation, which differs from the one used by Vickers [16] because it assumes a
finite population in its derivation.
In this paper we show that Durrett and Levin’s finite population spatial replicator is gen-
eralizable to an arbitrary payoff matrix. We then focus our attention on the one-dimensional
rock-paper-scissors game, which has interesting properties in both the finite and infinite population
cases. In particular, we show: (i) we show that the model used by Vicker’s [16] arises naturally
as the infinite population limit of the generalization of Durrett and Levin’s model, which in turn
can be derived from a stochastic cellular automaton (particle) model as a fluid limit. (ii) The
one dimensional infinite population spatial rock-paper-scissors dynamic has a constant amplitude
traveling wave solution for all time. However, the finite population version does not exhibit such
solutions, but does seem to exhibit an attracting stationary solution. We illustrate the latter result
numerically.
2 Model
Let A ∈ Rn×n be a payoff matrix for a symmetric game [4]. All vectors are column vectors unless
otherwise noted. Below we construct a stochastic cellular automaton and show that the fluid
limit of this system yields a generalization of Durrett and Levin’s specific finite population spatial
replicator.
The state of cell i at time index k of the cellular automaton is a tuple 〈U1(i, k), . . . , Un(i, k)〉
where Uj(i, k) provides the size of the population of species j at position i at time k. For simplic-
ity, we assume that species interaction may only happen between cells and not within cells; i.e.,
the U1(i, k) members of species 1 will not play against the Un(i, k) members of species n. This
assumption will become irrelevant in the limit.
During state update, an agent A at cell i chooses a random direction (cell i′ ) and a random
member of the population (agent A′) within that cell. Assume Agent A uses strategy r while Agent
A′ uses strategy s. After play, there are α·Ars additional agents at cell i using strategy r and β ·Ars
additional agents playing strategy r at cell i′, where α+β = 1 is the probability of motion from cell
i to cell i′. If Ars < 0, then agents are removed from their respective cells. To avoid computational
issues when more members of a species die than are present, A can be modified so that Ars ≥ −1
for all r, s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, without altering the evolutionary dynamics [2]. The update rule for a single
agent is illustrated in Fig. 1. The process described above and illustrated in Fig. 1 is assumed to be
happening simultaneously for each agent and we assume that the replication/death as a result of
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Figure 1: Illustration of a single interaction in a spatial game on a one-dimensional lattice; α+β = 1
game play along with the migration are happening on (roughly) the same time scale. Using these
assumptions, we can construct mean-field equations for the population Ur at position i and time
k + 1 in a 1-D cellular automaton, assuming an equal likelihood that agents diffuse left or right.
The mean number of agents playing strategy r present at position i at time k+ 1 is determined by:
1. The expected number of agents who remain at cell i: αUr(i, k)
2. The expected number of new agents created at cell i who remain at cell i:
α
2
Ur(i, k)
(∑
s
Ars (us(i+ 1, k) + us(i− 1, k))
)
.
3. The expected number of agents who migrate to position i from neighboring cells:
β
2
(Ur(i+ 1, k) + Ur(i− 1, k)) .
4. The expected number of agents created in a neighboring cell who migrate to cell i:
β
2
(Ur(i+ 1, k) + Ur(i− 1, k))
∑
s
Arsus(i, k).
Here us(i, k) is the proportion of the population at cell i playing strategy s at time step k.
Let u(i, k) = 〈u1(i, k), . . . , un(i, k)〉. Re-writing sums as matrix products, the expected number
of agents playing strategy r at cell i at time k + 1 is:
Ur(i, k + 1) = αUr(i, k) +
β
2
(Ur(i+ 1, k) + Ur(i− 1, k)) +
α
2
Ur(i, k)
(
eTrA (u(i+ 1, k) + u(i− 1, k))
)
+
β
2
(Ur(i+ 1, k) + Ur(i− 1, k)) eTrAu(i, k). (5)
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Assume the cellular grid has lattice spacing ∆x. Following [20] and using a Taylor approxima-
tion, we can write:
Ur(x, t+ ∆t) ≈ Ur(x, t) + ∆t∂Ur(x, t)
∂t
+O(∆t2)
Ur(x+ ∆x, t) ≈
2∑
j=0
∆xj
j!
∂jUr(x, t)
∂xj
+O(∆x3).
3 Derivation of Fluid Limits
We proceed to derive the mean-field approximation. Passing to the continuous case and assuming
that interaction rates decrease linearly with ∆t, we can write a second order approximation of
Eq. (5) as:
∆t
∂Ur(x, t)
∂t
= αUr(x, t) + β
(
Ur(x, t) +
1
2
∆x2
∂2Ur
∂x2
)
+
α∆tUr(x, t) · eTrA
(
u(x, t) +
1
2
∆x2
∂2u
∂x2
)
+
β∆t
(
Ur(x, t) +
1
2
∆x2
∂2Ur
∂x2
)
eTrAu(x, t)− Ur(x, t). (6)
Where the −Ur(x, t) on the right-hand-side arises from the formation of the Newton quotient on
the left-hand-side. Expanding and simplifying yields:
∆t
∂Ur(x, t)
∂t
=
β
2
∆x2
∂2Ur
∂x2
+ ∆tUr(x, t)e
T
rAu(x, t)+
α∆t
2
∆x2Ur(x, t)e
T
rA
∂2u
∂x2
+
β∆t
2
∆x2
∂2Ur
∂x2
eTrAu(x, t). (7)
Assume β ∈ (0, 1]. Dividing through by ∆t and assuming that lim∆t→0 ∆x2/∆t = 2D/β yields:
∂Ur(x, t)
∂t
= Ur(x, t)e
T
rAu(x, t) +D
∂2Ur
∂x2
. (8)
The constant D is the diffusion constant and the assumption that
lim
∆t→0
∆x2/∆t = 2D/β
is a variant of the assumption used to derive Fick’s Law [21] and identical when β = 1.
These are the spatial dynamics used by Durrett and Levin, (in the first part of their paper),
but are derived only by adding a diffusion term to the standard finite population growth equations.
In [19], Durrett and Levin note that they derive a set of equations they feel are more appropriate
for modeling finite spatial systems. Their derivation at the end of [19] (for a specific hawk-dove
system) rests on the assumption that migration happens “on a much faster timescale” than game
interactions. Our model assumes that migration and game interactions occur on approximately
the same time scale. Under this assumption, Eq. (8) is the correct spatial adaptation for finite
populations; i.e., one simply adds a diffusion term. In the case where migration happens more
quickly, then the derivation in [19] may be used instead.
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4 Spatial Replicator with Finite Population
The derivation of Eqs. (1) and (2) are not given in [19]. They can be generalized for an arbitrary
evolutionary game using Eq. (8) as the starting point. Let:
M(x, t) =
∑
s
Us(x, t).
Differentiating we have:
∂
∂t
Ur(x, t)
M(x, t)
=
1
M(x, t)
∂Ur(x, t)
∂t
− ur(x, t)
∑
s
1
M(x, t)
∂Us(x, t)
∂t
.
Substituting from Eq. (8) we obtain:
∂ur
∂t
= ur ·
(
eTrAu− uTAu
)
+
D
M
(
∂2Ur
∂x2
− ur ·
∑
s
∂2Us
∂x2
)
. (9)
Unlike in the derivation of the standard replicator dynamic, the rate of change of the population
proportion is not solely a function of the proportions themselves.
We can remove dependence on the individual populations to derive an independent (coupled)
system of differential equations that includes only the total population. For arbitrary strategy r,
we can apply the quotient rule to obtain:
M
∂ur
∂x
=
∂Ur
∂x
− ur ∂M
∂x
Differentiating again, multiplying by 1/M and re-arranging yields the expression:
1
M
∂2Ur
∂x2
=
ur
M
∂2M
∂x2
+
2
M
∂ur
∂x
∂M
∂x
+
∂2ur
∂x2
.
Using this we can write
D
M
(
∂2Ur
∂x2
− ur
∑
s
∂2Us
∂x2
)
= D
(
2
M
∂M
∂x
∂ur
∂x
+
∂2ur
∂x2
)
Using this we can re-write Eq. (9) as:
∂ur
∂t
= ur ·
(
eTrAu− uTAu
)
+D
(
2
M
∂M
∂x
∂ur
∂x
+
∂2ur
∂x2
)
. (10)
The dynamics of M can be derived (by addition) from Eq. (8):
∂M
∂t
= MuTAu+D
∂2M
∂x2
.
Thus, we have a coupled set of differential equations written entirely in terms of u and M , rather
than Ur, M and u: 
∀r

∂ur
∂t
=ur ·
(
eTrAu− uTAu
)
+
D
(
2
M
∂M
∂x
∂ur
∂x
+
∂2ur
∂x2
)
∂M
∂t
= MuTAu+D
∂2M
∂x2
. (11)
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This is the spatial replicator equation for finite populations. Letting M = s and D = 1, we recover
the dynamics of Durrett and Levin. In contrast to the aspatial replicator, the inclusion of dynamics
for M yields a linearly independent system of differential equations.
Allowing M to approach infinity uniformly in x, we arrive at the fluid limit in terms of u alone;
this is the 1D nonlinear reaction-diffusion equation used by Vicker’s [16,17]:
∀r
{
∂ur
∂t
= ur ·
(
eTrAu− uTAu
)
+D
∂2ur
∂x2
. (12)
Generalization to N -dimensions is straightforward by replacing ∂2x with the Laplacian ∆. The
N -dimensional spatial replicator with finite population is given by:
∀r
{
∂ur
∂t
=ur ·
(
eTrAu− uTAu
)
+D
(
2
M
∇M · ∇ur + ∆ur
)
∂M
∂t
= MuTAu+D∆M.
Thus, the finite population case adds a nonlinear convection term that forces ur to follow the
population gradient. A similar system is studied by deForest and Belmonte in [11], where the
payoff gradient is followed instead of the population gradient.
In both Eqs. (11) and (12), we see that the aspatial replicator dynamics appear on the right
hand side perturbed by a spatial term. It is well known that the dynamics of the aspatial replicator
are confined to the n-dimensional simplex ∆n. This remains true for the spatial replicator dynam-
ics with finite populations. Moreover, the solution ur = 1 (i.e., there is only one population) is a
fixed point for the spatial replicator dynamic since the spatial derivative of the probability distri-
bution of the population proportions is zero and the time derivative is identically zero as expected.
Thus, pure populations are constant stationary solutions for these dynamics. Lastly, if u˜(x, t) is
a constant solution at a Nash equilibrium for the game defined by A, then the right-hand-side is
again identically zero by the Folk Theorem [4] of evolutionary game theory together with the fact
that there is no spatial variation. Thus every Nash equilibrium of the matrix game corresponds
to a spatially constant stationary solution of the spatial replicator dynamic in both the finite and
infinite population cases.
5 One Dimensional Rock-Paper-Scissors
Durrett and Levin’s analysis of Hawk-Dove was aided by the fact that one strategy can be elim-
inated, leaving a coupled system of two partial differential equations. In the remainder of this
paper, we analyze variations of rock-paper-scissors, which yield more interesting results because of
its cyclic three-strategy nature and because it can be easily parameterized as discussed in [2].
The generalized rock-paper-scissors (RPS) payoff matrix is given by:
A =
 0 −1 1 + a1 + a 0 −1
−1 1 + a 0
 .
When a = 0, this is the standard RPS game which has Nash equilibrium 〈13 , 13 , 13〉. This is the
unique interior fixed point and the aspatial replicator exhibits an elliptic fixed point at this Nash
equilibrium. This Nash equilibrium is preserved for a 6= 0; and corresponds to an asymptotically
stable interior fixed point when a > 0 and unstable fixed point when a < 0 [22].
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Let u = 〈ur, up, us〉 and note:
ζ(ur, up, us)
∆
= uTAu = a (urus + urup + usup) .
There are at least two classes of global solutions to Eq. (11):
Stationary Solution Here, ur = up = us =
1
3 and M solves:
0 =
a
3
M +M ′′
or there is a single population (e.g., ur = 1) and M is constant in x.
Oscillating Solution Here, u∗(x, t) ≡ υ∗(t) with ∗ ∈ {r, p, s} where υr, υp, υs are solutions to the
standard RPS replicator and M(x, t) = µ(t) satisfies linear equation:
µ˙ = ζ(υr, υp, υs)µ.
Solutions of this kind are also present for Eq. (12). The stationary solution class is relevant to our
analysis of the a > 0 case. The oscillating solution captures the long-run behavior of a = 0 case
under finite population dynamics. We consider the a < 0 case more deeply in the sequel.
5.1 The case when a = 0
When a = 0, we have ζ(ur, us, up) = 0 so that M is governed by the heat equation with diffusion
constant D. Assuming appropriate initial and boundary conditions, there is a global solution,
M(x, t). We express the convection coefficient of ∂xu∗ in Eq. (11) in terms of this solution:
(x, t) =
2D∂xM(x, t)
M(x, t)
.
Under appropriate boundary conditions, diffusion of the (locally) finite population implies that:
lim
t→∞M(x, t) = M
∗ > 0
lim
t→∞ (x, t) = 0.
Therefore, asymptotically (in time), any solution of Eq. (11) must also satisfy Eq. (12). Interest-
ingly, the convection term in the finite population case drives the long-term behavior of the system
to the oscillating solution while the infinite population spatial replicator equation converges to the
stationary solution. To see this, let a = 0, D = 1 and assume a periodic boundary condition
(evolution on an annulus or S1) with M(−pi, t) = M(pi, t), u∗(−pi, t) = u∗(pi, t) (∗ ∈ {r, p, s}).
Assume:
M(x, 0) = 2 + cos(x)
so that:
M(x, t) = 2 + e−t cos(x)
(x, t) =
−2e−t sin(x)
2 + e−t cos(x)
.
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Assuming:
ur(x, 0) =
1
3(1 + sin(x− 4pi/3)) (13)
up(x, 0) =
1
3(1 + sin(x− 2pi/3)) (14)
us(x, 0) =
1
3(1 + sin(x)). (15)
Unless otherwise noted, these are the initial conditions for all numerical examples. The (numerically
computed) solution to Eq. (11) is illustrated in Fig. 2. Notice the long-run behavior is consistent
with the oscillating solution. Since ζ(υr, υp, υs) ≡ 0 and we assumed a periodic boundary condi-
tion, M must approach a trivial stationary solution; i.e., M(x,∞) = 2. By way of comparison a
(a) Space-time Evolution
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Solution to Finite Population Spatial Replicator at x = 0
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Scissors
(b) Time Evolution (x = 0)
Figure 2: Evolution of the finite population spatial replicator converges to an oscillating solution
when a = 0.
(numerical) solution to the infinite population spatial replicator equation is shown in Fig. 3. In
(a) Space-time Evolution
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0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
t
u r
,u
p,
u s
Solution to Infinite Population Spatial Replicator at x = 0
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(b) Time Evolution (x = 0)
Figure 3: Evolution of the infinite population spatial replicator converges to a steady state solution
when a = 0. This is surprising since the Nash equilibrium fixed point is neutrally stable in the
aspatial replicator.
this case, the long-run behavior is consistent with the stationary solution. In the aspatial replicator
the fixed point corresponding to the Nash equilibrium is neutrally stable. Thus, the fixed point is
stabilized by the diffusion terms in Eq. (12).
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5.2 The case when a > 0
When a > 0, the stationary solution for M must satisfy:
M(x) = C1 sin
(√
a
3x
)
+ C2 cos
(√
a
3x
)
.
However, this solution is non-physical because it admits negative population counts and it is clear
from Eq. (11) that for nonnegative initial conditions, solutions will remain nonnegative. Therefore,
when a > 0, the finite population spatial replicator will not admit a stationary solution. Instead
we find that M(x, t)→∞ and t→∞ so that solutions asymptotically satisfy Eq. (12)
To see this we combine the fact that 〈13 , 13 , 13〉 is an asymptotically stable fixed point of the
aspatial replicator with a maximum principle argument for ∂ur∂t in Eq. (11) and note that for any
initial condition in the interior of ∆3 there is some ζ0 > 0 so that ζ(ur, up, us) ≥ ζ0. It follows that
the solution M(x, t) is bounded below by the solution of
m˙(t) = ζ0m, m(0) = min
x
M(x, 0) (16)
In particular, M is increasing everywhere and M(x, t)→∞ as n→∞ Consequently, (x, t)→ 0
for large t and any solution to Eq. (11) must asymptotically satisfy Eq. (12). This is illustrated
in Fig. 4 (here D = 12 , a =
1
10). Furthermore, linear stability analysis of Eq. (12) suggests that
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
t
u r
,u
p,
u s
Solution to Finite Population Spatial Replicator at x = 0 (a>0)
Rock
Paper
Scissors
(a) Time Evolution (x = 0) (b) Space-time Evolution
(c) Population Evolution
Figure 4: The evolution of the finite population spatial replicator is shown for a > 0. The population
proportions ur, up, us quickly approach the oscillating solution. As M increases, these oscillations
decay and the population proportions approach the stationary solution of the infinite population
case.
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the steady state solution ur = up = us =
1
3 should be asymptotically stable for Eq. (12) (see
Theorem 1 of [23]), since the aspatial replicator dynamics with a > 0 has an asymptotically stable
fixed point at the Nash equilibrium (see [22] or [4]). Our simulation suggests dynamics on two
time scales. Solutions quickly approach an oscillating solution. The oscillations in population
proportions ur, up, us then slowly decay toward the fixed point of the aspatial replicator as M
increases. When a < 0, the dynamics are more interesting, as we demonstrate below.
6 Traveling Waves When a < 0
Consider the infinite population model first. Letting z = x−ct, we can re-write Eq. (12) in compact
form as:
∀i
{
Dv′i = −ui
(
eTi Au− uTAu
)− cvi
u′i = vi
. (17)
For RPS we have the six dimensional linear system:
Dv′r = aurζ(ur, us, up)− ur(us − up)− aurus − cvr
u′r = vr
Dv′p = aupζ(ur, us, up)− up(ur − us)− aupur − cvp
u′p = vp
Dv′s = ausζ(ur, us, up)− us(up − ur)− ausup − cvs
u′s = vs.
If u∗ is a Nash equilibrium of A, then the pair u = u∗ and v = 0 is a fixed point of Eq. (17).
Linearizing about ur = up = us =
1
3 , vr = vp = vs = 0, we obtain the eigenvalues:
λ1,2 =
−3c±√9c2 + 12aD
6D
λ3,4 =
−3c±
√
9c2 + 6aD + 6D
√
3
√−(a+ 2)2
6D
λ5,6 =
−3c±
√
9c2 + 6aD − 6D√3√−(a+ 2)2
6D
.
We can simultaneously show that for appropriate choice of wave speed, a center manifold exists and
therefore a non-decaying traveling wave solution exists for the PDE. As a by-product, we compute
the wave speed for a non-decaying traveling wave in terms of a and D. Assume a ∈ (−2, 0). For
some constant b (to be determined), let:
(3c± bi)2 = 9c2 + 6aD ± 6D
√
3
√
−(a+ 2)2 = 9c2 + i6aD ± 6D(a+ 2)
√
3.
Expanding the left hand side and relating real and imaginary parts we have:
9c2 − b2 = 9c2 + 6aD
6bc = 6D(a+ 2)
√
3.
Solving for b and c yields:
b =
√−6aD
±c˜ = ±(a+ 2)
√
2k
2
√−a
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Without loss of generality, assume positive c˜. Using this information, we can obtain:
λ˜1,2 =
−3c˜±√9c˜2 + 12aD
6D
λ˜3 =
−6c˜− bi
6D
λ˜4 =
bi
6D
λ˜5 =
−6c˜+ bi
6D
λ˜6 =
−bi
6D
.
Our assumption that a < 0 and the fact that c˜ > 0 implies that Re(λ1,2) < 0 for all choices of
D > 0 and a ∈ (−2, 0). Therefore, this system has a four dimensional stable manifold and the
existence of two pure imaginary eigenvalues suggests a center manifold that allows the emergence
of the traveling wave solution.
Naturally, if c 6= c˜, there may still be a traveling wave, but its amplitude will decay (c > c˜)
or grow in time (c < c˜). Starting from the PDE it is difficult to determine what wave speed will
emerge (and therefore its relationship to a and D) given the initial conditions. However, traveling
waves can be observed with both increasing and decreasing amplitude; fine tuning the parameters
leads to a numerically stable traveling wave over the region of integration. This is illustrated in the
PDE system in Fig. 5 using a = −0.79 and D = 112 . For completeness, we note the negative wave
Figure 5: An example of a stable amplitude traveling wave solution is illustrated for RPS when
a < 0.
speed solution −c˜ implies an unstable fixed point (consistent with a < 0 in the aspatial replicator
dynamic). In this case, we would expect to see the proportions oscillate with increasing amplitude.
When the population is finite and a < 0, there is a value ζ0 > 0 so that ζ(ur, up, us) ≤ −ζ0 on
the interior of ∆3. It follows from Eq. (16) (substituting −ζ0 for ζ0) that the population on the real
line (or an annulus) will collapse. As M(x, t) → 0 everywhere, numeric solutions of the equation
can become unstable. Interestingly, the finite population term seems to impact the symmetry of the
wave fronts in the traveling wave that was illustrated in Fig. 5. This effect is illustrated in Fig. 6 in
which we illustrate a top-down side-by-side comparison of the waves generated by both the infinite
population replicator and the finite population replicator with a = −0.79 and D = 112 . The finite
(collapsing) population seems to cause the variations in the wave front boundaries. Additionally,
the wave seen in Figure 6b is not stable. The amplitudes of ur, us, ut are increasing in time (see
Fig. 7 This is most likely due to the fact that the finite population (convection) term is acting like
additional diffusion as the population collapse.
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(a) Infinite Population (b) Finite Population
Figure 6: A comparison of the dynamics of a stable traveling wave (left) and the resulting unstable
wave that results when finite populations are considered.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Solution to Finite Population Spatial Replicator at x = 0 (a<0)
Rock
Paper
Scissors
Figure 7: The amplitude of the traveling wave increases in the finite population case (x = 0). This
is consistent with the asymptotically unstable nature of the equilibrium when a < 0.
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7 Stable Steady State with a < 0
If the population size is held constant at the boundary (i.e., we replace the periodic boundary
conditions with Dirichlet boundary conditions) then steady state analysis becomes possible in the
finite population. Consider the steady state solution ur = up = us =
1
3 . The population steady
state equation is:
0 = −a
3
M +D
∂2M
∂x2
.
Imposing the non-zero symmetric boundary conditions M(−L, t) = M(L, t) = m0 > 0 yields the
steady state solution:
M(x) = α cosh
(√−a√
3D
x
)
,
where:
α = m0 sech
(√−a√
3D
L
)
.
Unlike the steady state solution for M when a > 0, this is physically realizable. When L = pi and
we operate on an annulus, we may imagine a point (at x = ±pi) where population is held constant
and then moves around the annulus to die. Suppose that u∗(L, t) = u∗(−L, t) = 13 (∗ ∈ {r, p, s}).
(a) Spacetime Plot
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Solution to Finite Population Spatial Replicator at x = 0 (a < 0)
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Figure 8: A stable stationary solution is illustrated with a “valley of death” for the population.
We conjecture that the steady state solution is stable for the finite population replicator. This is
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illustrated in Fig. 8 using the modified initial condition:
ur(x, 0) =
fr(x)
fr(x) + fp(x) + fs(x)
up(x, 0) =
fp(x)
fr(x) + fp(x) + fs(x)
us(x, 0) =
fs(x)
fr(x) + fp(x) + fs(x)
M(x, 0) = fr(x) + fp(x) + fs(x),
with
fr(x) = 25 + x
2(x− pi)(x+ pi)
fp(x) = 25− 2x(x− pi)(x+ pi)
fs(x) = 25− (x− pi)(x+ pi).
These equations satisfies the Dirichlet boundary condition u∗(−pi) = u∗(pi) = 13 and M(−pi) =
M(pi) = 75. (The exact value of m0 is irrelevant.) In Fig. 8, we set a = − 110 and D = 112 . The
long-run behavior of M(x, t) is shown in Fig. 8c. It is clear that the solution has converged to the
stationary state.
It is worth nothing that the stability of the steady state solution is entirely a function of the
Dirichlet boundary conditions. To see this, we can use use the initial population distributions from
Eqs. (13) to (15) with consistent boundary conditions. In this case, a standing wave emerges in the
finite population spatial replicator as the long-run behavior and the long-run population behavior
is no longer described by a hyperbolic cosine. This is shown in Fig. 9a. By way of comparison,
the corresponding Dirichlet boundary conditions in infinite population spatial replicator equation
yield a highly complex wave structure that is similar to the oscillating solutions identified earlier
(see Fig. 9b).
(a) Finite Population (b) Infinite Population
Figure 9: A comparison of the finite and infinite population replicator with Dirichlet boundary
conditions and a < 0 illustrates a standing wave in the finite population case and an oscillating
pattern in the infinite population case.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper we studied a finite and infinite population spatial replicator. We showed how the
finite population spatial replicator can be derived from first principles from a stochastic cellular
automaton model and from there how the infinite population replicator used by Vickers [16, 17]
follows from this. This result generalizes the work of Durrett and Levin [19] who first derived and
studied the finite population spatial replicator for a specific game. We then compared the finite
and infinite population spatial replicator for rock-paper-scissors on a one dimensional annulus one
dimension (S1). Most interestingly, we showed that for a certain rock-paper-scissors variant stable
amplitude traveling waves can emerge as solutions to the infinite population spatial replicator, but
these are destroyed by population collapse in the finite population spatial replicator. We studied
population collapse using Dirichlet boundary conditions on S1 and illustrated the structure of
steady state solutions, including standing waves.
The finite population spatial replicator is intriguing because it is a highly non-linear reaction-
convection-diffusion equation where convection is governed by the per capita bulk population mo-
tion. Consequently, it may be particularly useful for studying human behavior, where large popula-
tions tend to move as a result of regional crises and strategies (i.e., behaviors) may represent human
interaction patterns. Studying a simpler game (as Durrett and Levin did with Hawk-Dove) may il-
lustrate additional behaviors. Certainly proving our conjecture that when u∗(L, t) = u∗(−L, t) = 13
(∗ ∈ {r, p, s}) and M(L, t) = M(−L, t) = m0 the finite population spatial replicator converges
to the proposed steady state solution is a clear future direction. In addition to this, identifying
more ways in which the finite and infinite spatial replicators differ in terms of solutions would be
interesting. The most interesting differences in the case of RPS seem to occur when the popula-
tion is collapsing. It would be intriguing to find cases where population collapse is not the main
driver in behavioral differences, since tautologically this must cause differences in finite vs. infinite
population equations.
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